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Ours is a time of unparalleled prosperity and peace, of hope in humankind
and its seemingly limitless ability to race toward new horizons. Yet Charles
Dickens's appellation has never rung so true: It is the best and worst of times.'
The severity of mass killings in our own.time, on the eve
of the millennium, reflects how little we know of our-
selves, of our neighbors, and of our future. Neither our
faith in the impressive march of technology nor our other
aspirations... can overshadow the grotesque reality of the
massacres that characterize civilization, or the lack
thereof, in today's troubled world.2
The international community has plunged into this grotesque morass and
emerged with hope in the form of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court.
In July 1998, an overwhelming majority of the world's nations voted for
the Rome Statute's version of the International Criminal Court ("the Court").
Yet to a few nations, the Rome Statute represented an acrid antidote to the
J.D. 2000, University of Georgia.
See CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF TWO CITIES I (Modem Library 1996) (1859).
2 David Scheffer, Congressional Testimony, July 23, 1998 (visited Sept. 13, 1998) <http://
www.usia.gov/topical/pol/usandun/schef23.htm> [hereinafter Congressional Testimony] (David
Scheffer is the United States Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues and the Head of the
United States Delegation at the Rome Conference).
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poison of modem inhumanity. In the end, the United States was one of seven
countries refusing to vote for the statute's version of the Court.3
After briefly examining the history and development of an international
criminal court, this note will turn to the evolution of the United States' views
of such a court. After years of somewhat tepid support, Congress and the
Clinton Administration in the early to mid-1990s warmed up to the notion,
offering cautious support for the concept of an international criminal court.
At the same time, elements within Congress and the Administration began to
formulate specific United States' objectives for an international criminal
tribunal.
Following this synopsis of the United States stance on the Court, this paper
will give an overview of the Rome Statute. Specifically, the definitions of
offenses, jurisdictional structure, and composition of the Court will be
explored.
Finally, the bulk of this effort will center around United States concerns
with the International Criminal Courtd--in short, why the United States
refused to sign onto the Rome Statute. The United States' chief concerns
relate to the Court's "trigger" mechanism, or who may initiate investigations,
the role of the prosecutor, the Court's jurisdiction, problems with the crime of
aggression, and finally, constitutional issues. This paper outlines and
discusses various arguments against United States ratification of the Rome
Statute. Instead of falling into the trap of resting on idealistic platitudes or
doling out underdeveloped criticisms, this note presents and refutes the best
arguments against United States' ratification of the statute. In the end, it is in
the United States' best interests to ratify the Rome Statute.
The United States' concerns are by no means indicative of unfounded
paranoia, especially given that nation's dominant role in international military
actions, which expose many United States citizens to trouble spots and
potentially, to the Court's jurisdiction. Yet the substantive provisions of the
Rome Statute significantly address the United States' primary concerns with
the Court. Given this, the statute is a document which is largely compatible
with United States' policy interests. The United States should therefore give
serious thought to joining other nations in ratifying the Rome Statute.
' See Michael P. Scharf, Results of the Rome Conferencefor an International Criminal
Court, ASIL Insight (visited Sept. 13, 1998) <http://asil.org/insigh23.htm>. A vote forthe Rome
Statute's version of the Court should not be confused with ratification of that statute or even
with an intent to ratify.
4 Throughout this note, to reduce linguistic awkwardness, the Court is referred to in the
present tense even though it does not yet exist.
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II. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
The concept of an international criminal court was not an invention of the
latter half of the twentieth century. Rather, a permanent court was first
proposed by the International Law Association (ILA) in 1926 after an
inadequate response to World War I war crimes prosecutions.5 The draft,
however, was never officially considered.6
After the horrors of the Second World War, the Allies decided to try the
Axis leaders at Nuremberg rather than execute them.7 Thus, the first
international military tribunal in history was born.' The four Allied
powers-the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Un-
ion-created the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg by
agreement on August 8, 1945. 9 Nineteen other nations also subsequently
assented to the agreement, giving the Nuremberg Tribunal an aura of
international consensus."0 The Nuremberg Tribunal tried Nazis for crimes
against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity." Twenty-two
individuals were tried by the tribunal, and of those, nineteen were found guilty
and three were acquitted.' 2 The IMT established that aggressive war, which
includes crimes against peace, war crimes, or crimes against humanity, is
' See J. Holmes Armstead, Jr., The International Criminal Court: History, Development
and Status, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 745, 747 (1998). The ILA draft envisioned the Court as
a division of the Permanent Court of International Justice. See also Leila Sadat Wexler, The
Proposed Permanent International Criminal Court: An Appraisal, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 665,
671 (1996).
6 See Wexler, supra note 5, at 665, 671.
7 See id. at 672-73. Justice Robert Jackson opened the Nuremberg Tribunal with this
statement: 'That four great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury stay the hand of
vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to thejudgment of the law is one of the
most significant tributes that Power ever has paid to Reason." Id. at 673.
' See Benjamin B. Ferencz, International Criminal Courts: The Legacy ofNuremberg, 10
PACE INT'L L. REv. 203, 211 (1998).
9 See Wexler, supra note 5, at 673-74.
'o See id. at 674 n.48.
See Matthew Lippman, Nuremberg: Forty Five Years Later, 7 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1, 26
(1991).
"2 See Wexler, supra note 5, at 675.
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contrary to international law and is therefore punishable. 3 The foundations for
international criminal law were thus laid. '4
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East at Tokyo (IMTFE),
also coming on the heels of World War II, bore little resemblance to its distant
European cousin. Unlike the IMT, the IMTFE was not created by international
treaty.' 5 Instead, the IMTFE was created by General Douglas MacArthur, the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, acting on behalf of the Far
Eastern Commission.1 6  In a special proclamation, General MacArthur
established the IMTFE's jurisdiction and substantive law. 7 Under the
tribunal's charter, MacArthur had the power to appoint judges and the
president of the tribunal. Moreover, MacArthur appointed the Chief of
Counsel who led the prosecution."' Although General MacArthur attempted
to downplay his role in the proceedings, his involvement was readily
apparent.' 9 In the end, the IMTFE, reflecting at least a trifle of international
consensus, offered at best a measured step toward a permanent international
criminal court.
After the Second World War, discussions began concerning the establish-
ment of a permanent international criminal court. An International Law
Commission (ILC) committee constructed draft statutes in 1951 and 1953.20
Yet for years there was no political will to create an international court.2 '
In 1989, perhaps coinciding with the subsidence of Cold War tensions,
many nations showed a renewed interest in creating an international criminal
court. In December of that year, the United Nations General Assembly
requested that the ILC inquire into the issues associated with an international
" See Ferencz, supra note 8, at 212; see also ROBERT E. CONOT, JUSTICE AT NUREMBERG
21-23 (1983) (stating that, ironically, the British, Russians, and French opposed the American
desire to indict the Germans for launching an aggressive war. The other allies were concerned
that their wartime activities could be construed as aggression).
14 See Ferencz, supra note 8, at 215.
's See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The
Need to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11, 32
(1997) (stating that this was perhaps due to United States' desires to limit any Soviet influence
in the region and United States' concerns about Japan's post-war conduct).
16 See id. at 32. The Far Eastern Commission was agreed to in order to give the Soviet
Union some control over the future of Japan as a reward for its entry into the war. But control
of the Far Eastern Commission was left to the United States. See id.
1 See Wexler, supra note 5, at 673 n.46.
IS See id.
'9 See Bassiouni, supra note 15, at 33.
20 See Wexler, supra note 5, at 679, 682.
2 See id. at 682.
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tribunal.22 The ILC deliberated on the issue from 1990 to 1994 and issued a
draft statute in 1994.2a After receiving the ILC draft, the General Assembly
established an ad hoc committee to review issues involved in the draft statute.
After the committee deliberated in the summer of 1995, the General Assembly
established a Preparatory Committee to work toward a draft that would be
generally accepted.24 The Preparatory Committee continued to meet in 1997
and 1998 and completed a draft Convention of the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court in April 1998. The draft was delivered to the
Conference of Plenipotentiaries, which met in Rome from June 15 to July 17,
1988.25 On July 17, 1998, this Rome Conference adopted the final Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court.26
As the ILC was deliberating and drafting the document in the early 1990s,
unspeakable atrocities were occurring in the former Yugoslavia.27  The
Security Council created the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia in 1993 .2 At that time, no international court since the Nuremberg
and Tokyo tribunals had tried individuals for crimes under international law.29
One year later, in 1994, the Security Council created another ad hoc tribunal
to address the situation in Rwanda. 30 The Yugoslavia and Rwanda ad hoc
22 Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/10, para. 3 (1998).
23 See id. para 4.
24 See id. paras. 6-7.
25 See id. paras. I 1-13.
26 Rome Statute ofthe International Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic Conference
of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
27 The Honorable Gabriele Kirk McDonald, president of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, stated that one witness testified to the tribunal that she had suffered
multiple rapes only then to find her husband's body with eyes, ears, and nose gouged out. See
Claudio Grossman et al., International Support for International Criminal Tribunals and an
International Criminal Court, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1413, 1434 (1998). In another case, an
indictment described how a victim was raped by fifteen men over three hours and later raped for
an entire night by many men. See id. at 1434-35.
28 See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993),
available in 32 I.L.M. 1203 (1993).
29 See Bartrarn S. Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of
National Courts and International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 383, 384 (1998).
30 See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994),
available in 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1994).
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tribunals demonstrated to many that persons in modem times could, at least in
some fashion, be held accountable under international law.3'
While the ad hoc tribunals were largely seen as successful in that some
criminals were held accountable under international law, problems did arise.
First, many have charged that ad hoc courts are afflicted with "tribunal
fatigue," meaning that the process of creating and administering an interna-
tional tribunal is slow, unwieldy, and expensive.32 In addition, many nations
without a seat on the Security Council are wary of the ad hoc tribunal approach
initiated by the Security Council because it gives permanent members of the
Security Council the ability to insulate themselves and their allies from
investigation.33 Moreover, some have suggested that ad hoc courts have limited
deterrence power. These tribunals are established after the crimes occur and
arguably do little to make perpetrators fear accountability under international
law.34 Reliance on ad hoc tribunals also creates, at minimum, an appearance
that enforcement of international criminal law is selective or inconsistent.35
"' See, e.g., United States Mission to the United Nations, US. Statement on the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, Oct. 31, 1996, 6th Comm. (visited Sept. 21, 1998) <gopher://gopher.
igc.apc.org:70/00/orgs/icc/natldocs/GA5 1/us.1096> ("There is no doubt that the ad hoc war
crimes tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda have been critical first steps" to
making international criminals truly accountable under international law.).
32 See Challenges Confronting International Justice (address by the United States
Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues at the New England School of Law, Boston,
Massachusetts, January 14, 1998) U.S. DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH, Jan. 11, 1998, at 19,
available in 1998 WL 12885527; see also Michael P. Scharf, Results of the Rome Conference
for an International Criminal Court, ASIL Insight (visited Sept. 13,1998) <http://www.asil
.org/insigh23.htm>.
" See Michael P. Scharf, The Politics of Establishing an International Criminal Court, 6
DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 167, 170 (1995). Malaysia, for example, urged that Security Council
intervention could undermine the independence of the Court. U.N. Press Release GA/L/3044,
Sixth Committee-10-, 11 th meeting (1997).
"' See Henry T. King & Theodore L. Theofrastous, From Nuremberg to Rome: A Step
Backward for U.S. Foreign Policy, 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 47, 64 (1999); cf Scheffer
Lecture, The Hague, Sept. 19, 1997 (visited Oct. 28, 1999) <http://www.usia.gov/topical/pol/
usandun/schefl9.htm> [hereinafter Scheffer Lecture, The Hague] (stating that the ad hoc
tribunals were "critical first steps" to making perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes realize that "they cannot escape the long reach of international law").
" See David Stoelting, Status Report on the International Criminal Court, 3 HOFSTRA L.
& POL'Y SYMP. 233, 238 (1999). For example, why should a tribunal be established to
investigate alleged abuses in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda but not those in Cambodia
under the Khmer Rouge?
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As a result of the problems of ad hoc tribunals, interest in a permanent
international criminal court began to build.36
III. EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN VIEWS AND OBJECTIVES
CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
In the mid to late 1980s, prior to any significant international movement
toward an international criminal court, the United States, and the United States
Congress in particular, lent general support to the idea of a limited court that
would prosecute terrorists and drug traffickers. For example, the 1986
Omnibus Security and Terrorism Act mandated that the president "consider the
possibility of eventually establishing an international tribunal for prosecuting
terrorists. 3 7 In 1989, when asked about the possibility of an international
court, Secretary of State James Baker termed the idea "interesting." He added
that the concept had "some fundamental problems" but noted that the idea was
worthy of consideration.38 By 1990 some within Congress, including Senator
Arlan Specter (Republican, Pennsylvania), a long-time proponent of an
international court, favored a tribunal with jurisdiction broader than that
previously discussed.39
The aftermath of the Persian Gulf War in 1991 brought renewed vigor to
United States congressional support for a limited international court. Yet the
Senate favored only a tribunal with jurisdiction over war crimes involving
Iraqi leaders and soldiers.40 Especially when read in conjunction with a
subsequent concurrent resolution passed only by the House of Representatives,
36 See id. (stating that "[i]n the 21st Century we will need a permanent court that both deters
such heinous crimes globally and stands prepared to investigate and prosecute their
perpetrators").
17 Charles Bataglia, Chronology of Contemporary U.S. Positions on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court, I INDIANA INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 39, 40 (1991).
" Id. at 41 (stating that "we could probably reach some sort of a United States position on
that and then after some period of time, perhaps an international agreement").
39 See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. S18160-01 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1990). Specter endorsed an
international court and noted that many countries are "seriously being affected" by crimes "such
as aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity, apartheid, torture, piracy on board
commercial vessels, aircraft hijacking, kidnaping [sic] of diplomats. taking of civilian
hostages and environmental damages to name a few." Id.
40 See S. Res. 76, 102d Cong., 137 CONG. REC. S3345-01 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1991)
("Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the President should confer with Kuwait, other
member nations of the coalition or the United Nations to establish an International Criminal
Court or an International Military Tribunal to try and punish all individuals involved in the
planning or execution of the above referenced crimes, including Saddam Hussein.").
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it appears that Congress favored the creation of an ad hoc court with
jurisdiction limited to the Iraqis.4 '
In 1993, as the debate over the International Criminal Court began to focus
on more substantive issues and draft provisions, Congress and the executive
branch each offered qualified support for the Court. As the ILC was
deliberating on its draft statute, the Clinton administration decided to take a
"fresh look" at the establishment of the Court.42 In the words of Conrad K.
Harper, the State Department legal adviser, "the concept of an international
criminal court is an important one, and one in which we have a significant and
positive interest. 4 3 At the same time, the administration expressed concerns
about the ILC draft's treatment of subject-matter jurisdiction, definitions of
crimes, appellate procedure, and drug and terrorism-related crimes."
The Senate's approach to the Court mirrored the cautious stance of the
Clinton administration. In the 1994 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, the
Senate declared that an international criminal court would greatly strengthen
the international rule of law, thereby serving the interests of the United
States.45 Thus, the Senate advised the United States delegation to advance this
proposal at the United Nations.46 Some senators, however, suggested that the
Senate would not consent to a treaty that "permits representatives of any
terrorist organization" or citizens of any country listed by the secretary of state
as having repeatedly provided support for acts of terrorism to sit in judgment
of American citizens.47 Some senators also intimated that unless American
citizens were guaranteed their First and Fourth Amendment rights (including
the right to freedom of speech and the right to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures by the government), Senate consent would not be
forthcoming.48 Until the mid- 1990s, Congress remained vaguely supportive
of the tribunal but did not delve into the specifics of any proposals.49
"' See H. R. Con. Res. 137, 105th Cong., 143 CONG.REC. H10870-02 (daily ed. Nov. 13,
1997) (declaring that "it is the sense of the House of Representatives that the Congress... work
actively and urgently within the international community for the adoption of a United Nations
Security Council resolution establishing an International Criminal Court for Iraq").
42 See 139 CONG. REC. S14443-02 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993).
43 Id.
4 See id.
41 See H.R. 2333, 103d Cong., 108 Stat. 382 (1994).
46 See id.
47 S. Res. 559, 103d Cong., 140 CONG. REC. S559-02 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1994).
41 See id.
49 See Timothy C. Evered, An International Criminal Court: Recent Proposals and
American Concerns, 6 PACE INT'L L. REV. 121,130 (1994).
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The Clinton administration continued this bargaining stance of qualified
support. In an October 1996 statement to the United Nations General
Assembly, the United States pledged its support for "the establishment of a
permanent international criminal court" even as members of the Preparatory
Committee attempted to pen a generally accepted draft.5" The United States
went on to pronounce its positions on several issues. Among other things, the
United States advocated a strong Security Council role and clear and detailed
definitions of crimes.51
IV. OVERVIEW OF THE ROME STATUTE ESTABLISHING
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
The Rome Statute limits the Court's jurisdiction to genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.52 The statute
indicates these are the "most serious crimes of international concern."53 The
text of the statute lays out detailed definitions of offenses for genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes.54 The crime of aggression, however, is not
defined by the statute but will be defined later by amendment. 5 In addition,
the Elements of Crimes will be adopted by a two-thirds majority of states
parties in order to assist the Court in the interpretation of the definitions of
crimes.5"
The Rome Statute advances a policy of strict construction concerning
interpretation of the definitions of offenses. The definitions of crimes are to
be "strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. '57 This "strict
construction" policy mirrors the United States' insistence that the Court
prosecute for violations of "well-established crimes" and not for "violations
'0 United States Mission to the United Nations, U.S. Statement on the International
Criminal Court, GAOR 6th Comm., 51st Sess., (Oct. 31, 1996) (visited Sept. 21, 1998)
<gopher://gopher.igc.apc.org:70/00/orgs/icc/natldocs/GA5 /us. 1096>.
", See id. (mentioning also that member states should only be able to refer "situations" and
not lodge charges against individuals and that the United States also supported ajurisdictional
system characterized by complementarity, where the international court would only complement
or supplement national jurisdiction).
52 Rome Statute, supra note 26, art. 5; see Congressional Testimony, supra note 2
(indicating that the conference adopted an annexed resolution that stated that crimes of terrorism
and drug crimes should be included within the jurisdiction of the Court).
53 Rome Statute, supra note 26, art. I.
5 See id. arts. 6-8.
• See id. arts. 5, 121 and 122.
56 See id. art. 9.
17 Id. art. 22(2).
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of principles. '8 A strict textual interpretation inevitably would reduce the
amount of discretion the prosecutor or others would have in investigating and
prosecuting.
In addition to specifying a regime of strict statutory construction, the statute
incorporates "threshold" levels into the definitions of several offenses. These
thresholds limit the number of acts included in the Court's jurisdiction. For
example, crimes against humanity include certain acts "when committed as
part of a widespread or systematic attack."59 So murder, torture, rape, or
enslavement, for instance, are not crimes against humanity if not part of a
"widespread" attack "directed against any civilian population." °  The
definition of war crimes similarly allows jurisdiction when the acts are
committed as part of a "plan or policy" or on a "large scale.'
While the definition of genocide adopted in the statute does not contain a
quantitative threshold, it does require a specific mens rea, or intent, of the
actor. Genocide, by definition, requires killing or other acts "with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. 62
So even though genocide is not required to occur on a large scale or as part of
a plan for the Court to have jurisdiction, this mens rea requirement limits acts
that fall under the Court's jurisdiction.
Assuming that crimes have occurred, there are several other prerequisites
for the Court to exercise jurisdiction. The Court has jurisdiction only if a state
involved is a party to the statute. At least one of the following must be a party
to the statute or must have accepted jurisdiction of the Court: the state where
the conduct occurred or the state of the accused.6a In addition, jurisdiction
must be triggered either by a referral to the prosecutor or by initiation of an
5' David Scheffer, US. Policy and the Proposed Permanent International Criminal Court,
Address Before the Carter Center, Atlanta, Georgia (Nov. 13, 1997), in U.S. DEP'T STATE
DISPATCH, Dec. 1, 1997, at 19 [hereinafter US. Policy].
59 Rome Statute, supra note 26, art. 7. Crimes against humanity include murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation or forcible transfer of population, imprisonment or
other severe deprivation of physical liberty, torture, rape, sex offenses (including rape, sexual
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization), persecution on certain
grounds, enforced disappearance, apartheid, and "other inhumane acts of similar character....
Id.
6 Id.
6 Id. art. 8. According to Professor Edward M. Wise, "Genocide has always been
understood as requiring a 'specific intent' or purpose." Yet article 30(2) of the Rome Statute
defines "intent" as if it were knowledge. This problem may be addressable in the Elements of
Crimes. Association ofAmerican Law Schools Panel on the International Criminal Court, 36
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 223, 246 (1999).
62 Rome Statute, supra note 26, art. 6.
63 See id. art. 12(2).
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investigation by the prosecutor herself." A referral, if used, must be issued by
a state party or by the Security Council acting under chapter VII of the UN
Charter.65 For example, one nation might refer a situation to the prosecutor.
Or, alternatively, the prosecutor may begin an investigation under her own
initiative, or "proprio motu," based on "information on crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court. '' 6
Ifjurisdiction exists, the case must also be admissible in order for the Court
to hear the matter. The statute declares cases inadmissible where the case is
already being investigated or prosecuted (or has been investigated) by a state
with jurisdiction. Therefore, for example, if Serbia (assuming it were to
ratify the Rome Statute and the statute had entered into force) had either
investigated or prosecuted a case over which it had jurisdiction, then the case
would be inadmissible before the Court. An exception to this rule occurs when
the state with jurisdiction is "unwilling or unable genuinely" to investigate or
prosecute.68 Somewhat remarkably, the statute allows the prosecutor initially
to determine when a state is "unwilling or unable genuinely" to prosecute.69
Ifjurisdiction is determined to exist, and the case is admissible, then there
is only one other possible obstacle to the Court hearing the case. The statute
mandates that the Security Council may delay investigation or prosecution for
twelve months in a resolution adopted under chapter VII of the UN Charter.70
This deferral ability is especially powerful since the Security Council may
' See id. art. 13(a)-(c).
65 See id. art. 13(a)-(b).
Id. art. 15(1).
67 See id. art. 17.
68 See id. art. 17(b). At least one writer has argued that one way to demonstrate that a court
is "unwilling or unable genuinely" to investigate or prosecute is that the court is not able to
provide minimum guarantees necessary for a fair trial. Sara Stapleton, Note, Ensuring a Fair
Trial in the International Criminal Court: Statutory Interpretation and the Impermissibility of
Derogation, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL. 535, 544 (1999).
69 Rome Statute, supra note 26, art. 53(1)(b). In deciding whether to initiate an
investigation, "the Prosecutor shall consider whether: (b) The case is or would be admissible
under article 17." Id. Yet article 17(1) states that "the Court shall determine that a case is
inadmissible," and elsewhere the ability to rule on the admissibility of evidence is attributed to
the pre-trial chamber. Id. art. 64(8)(a). So it would seem that the prosecutor initially makes this
evaluation, which may subsequently be overturned by the pre-trial chamber.
7" Id. art. 16. Chapter VII of the UN Charter states: "The Security Council shall determine
the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and
42, to maintain or restore international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
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renew the deferral.7 The Security Council in this way may delay a prosecu-
tor's investigation, perhaps indefinitely.
72
After receiving a referral of a situation or upon the prosecutor's own
initiative, the prosecutor begins an investigation. First, the prosecutor must
determine the seriousness of the information obtained regarding the situation.73
If the prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with the
investigation, then he must request authorization for an investigation from the
pre-trial chamber. That body then evaluates whether the Court has jurisdiction
and whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed.74 If the prosecutor finds no
reasonable basis to continue or concludes that there is not a sufficient basis for
a prosecution,75 then the state that referred the matter may appeal the
prosecutor's decision to the pre-trial chamber.76 The pre-trial chamber also
conducts such pre-trial functions as issuing warrants of arrest and summons to
appear.77 The actual trials are conducted by the trial chamber, a group of three
judges of the trial division.78
The Court is composed of eighteen judges who are dispersed among the
presidency, an appeals division, a pre-trial division, and a trial division.79 The
number of judges, however, may be changed by a two-thirds vote of state
parties."0 Each candidate for election shall be competent in criminal law and
procedure or in relevant areas of international law.' In addition to providing
71 See Rome Statute, supra note 26, art. 16.
72 See id. The Statute leaves open the possibility that the Security Council may renew its
request for deferral indefinitely. The Statute states that the "request may be renewed by the
council under the same conditions." Id.
71 See id. art. 15(2). The prosecutor may seek such information from "States, organs of the
United Nations, intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations, or other reliable
sources .... Id.
74 See id. art. 15(4).
7s. See id. art. 53(2)(c) (indicating that the prosecutor may decline to prosecute because "a
prosecution is not in the interests ofjustice, taking into account all the circumstances, including
the gravity of the crime, the interests of victims and the age or infirmity of the alleged
perpetrator..."). Id.
76 See id. art. 53(3)(a).
77 See id. arts. 57-61.
71 See id. art. 39.
79 See id. art. 34. The presidency, composed of the president and the first and second vice-
presidents, is responsible for the administration of the Court, with the exception of the Office
of the Prosecutor, and for other statutory functions. See id. art. 38(3).
so See id. art. 36(2)(b).
"1 See id. art. 36(3)(b).
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for competent judges, the statute requires that they be independent. 2 As an
added safeguard to insure independence and fairness, no two judges may be
nationals of the same state. 3
V. EVALUATION OF CURRENT UNITED STATES' CONCERNS:
JURISDICTIONAL TRIGGERS AND THE PROSECUTOR'S ROLE
A major concern the United States has with the Rome Statute involves the
"trigger" mechanism for jurisdiction. Under the statute, whoever can initiate
investigations can trigger the Court'sjurisdiction. The statute provides for two
such triggers: by a state party referral of a situation to the prosecutor or by
prosecutorial initiative. 4
A majority of nations favored a prosecutor with powers to trigger
jurisdiction (or to receive the complaint directly from state parties) because
many nations felt that the Court would be less politicized if its investigations
were free from approval from any political body such as the Security
Council. 5 These nations argue that requiring Security Council approval for
jurisdiction to be triggered would effectively give a veto power to any member
of the Security Council. As a result, countries with representation on the
Security Council could insulate themselves from the Court'sjurisdiction. This
would politicize the process to the disadvantage of smaller nations without
permanent seats on the Security Council.86
During the Rome Conference, the United States reiterated its preference for
Security Council involvement in the Court's functions, including the "trigger"
mechanism. The United States put forth a plan allowing for Security Council
referrals to the Court. 7 The United States has desired that the Security
82 Rome Statute, supra note 26, art. 40 ("Thejudges shall be independent in the performance
of their functions.").
83 See id. art. 36(7).
84 Rome Statute, supra note 26, arts. 14, 15.
85 See Brown, supra note 29, at 427; see also Scheffer Lecture, The Hague, supra note 34.
86 Cf U.N. Press Release, Membership of Security Council Key Factor in Plan for World
Criminal Court, Legal Community Told, U.N. Doc. GA/L/3044 (1997), available at <http://
www.un.org (visited Jan. 14, 2000) (noting that India did not favor the Security Council being
given the power to take up matters before the Court or to bar states from brining matters before
the Court).
87 See Scheffer Lecture, The Hague, supra note 34. There the United States stated its
position that the Security Council should be able to refer situations to the prosecutor. In
addition, the United States believes that the Security Council should be able to undertake a
"mandatory" referral under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Although it is not stated,
the implication is that the Court in such a "mandatory" referral situation could not decline to
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Council approve the Court's involvement if the situation were one involving
international peace and security and the Security Council were already dealing
with the situation. 8' Thus, in these situations, the Security Council could
essentially veto the Court's exercise of jurisdiction. The United States has
argued that there is no alternative to Security Council approval because the
United Nations Charter mandates that the Security Council maintain and
restore international peace and security.89 The real, unspoken fear of the
United States, however, as articulated in other contexts, is that politically
motivated states could target American military personnel and citizens with
frivolous prosecutions.' The Security Council approval would enable the
United States to veto any action against its citizens, protecting members of its
far-flung military, at least in matters where international peace and security are
involved.
It is also out of fear of a politicized Court that the United States opposes a
prosecutor who may initiate investigations on her own without a state referral.
As mentioned, the United States preference is that the prosecutor investigate
crimes only when referred by state parties or by the Security Council. The
prosecutor would then decide whom to investigate and prosecute. 9' The
United States is concerned that a biased prosecutor could launch unfounded
political attacks in the form of investigations against citizens of the United
States. In the words of David Scheffer, who would later head the United
States delegation to the Rome Conference, "a completely independent
prosecutor would have free rein to probe into any and all decision-making
processes and military action anywhere ... ",,92 The United States has indicated




90 Cf. Statement on U.S. Participation in the Rome Conference on the Establishment ofan
International Criminal Court (visited Sept. 13, 1998) <http://www.usia.usemb.se/topical/
pol/usandun/statel2.htm> (stating that "[w]e must be careful to guard against the creation of an
ICC [International Criminal Court] that politically motivated states could manipulate to
challenge the actions of responsible governments by targeting their military and civilian
personnel...").
9, See Scheffer Lecture, The Hague, supra note 34; Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/49/355 (1994). The United
States' desire here was for a provision similar to that in the 1994 draft statute, where after
receiving a complaint by the Security Council, the prosecutor would initiate an investigation.
92 U.S. Policy, supra note 58, at 19.
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a self-initiating prosecutor at a later time.9 Yet it is clear that the United
States wants a weaker prosecutor in order to protect members of its military.
Is the United States' fear of a politicized prosecutor valid? The Rome
Statute offers several safeguards against abuses of the prosecutor's power.
The safeguards of the Rome Statute would not protect the United States'
interests in every conceivable situation, yet the risk of abuse would be
significantly minimized. In the end, these safeguards are likely to provide
effective checks against prosecutorial misconduct and protect the United
States' interests.
The first safeguard against an abuse of power is the requirement that the
prosecutor get independent authorization to continue an investigation. Under
the statute, if the prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to
proceed, he must then get authorization from the pre-trial chamber to
continue.94 If the prosecutor were motivated by political or personal goals,
then he would presumably not be able to obtain approval of the pre-trial
chamber and thus could not proceed with prosecution.
Requiring pre-trial chamber approval will likely be an adequate precaution
against prosecutorial abuse, as the approval of that body is unlikely to be
politicized due to its composition. After elections the court is to organize itself
as quickly as possible into divisions, one of which is the Pre-Trial Division.95
This division is to be composed of six or more judges.96 Since the divisions
are determined before any case comes before the Court, there is not much
chance that judges with certain predispositions would be chosen to rule on the
prosecutor's request for authorization in any particular situation.
The United States' objection to this pre-trial "approval" safeguard would
likely relate to the number of judges. The statute will probably be construed
so as to require that two judges on the pre-trial chamber concur in the
approval. Article 39 of the statute states that the functions of the pre-trial
chamber may be carried out either by three judges or by a single judge. 97 But
the statute also indicates that certain rulings of the pre-trial chamber, including
authorizations of investigations, "must be concurred in by a majority of its
9' See Richardson Remarks on International Criminal Court, Rome, June 17, 1998 (visited
Sept. 13, 1998) <http://www.usia.usemb.se/topical/pol/usandun/richcl 7.htm> (noting that "[a]t
best, the proposal for a self-initiating prosecutor is premature. We should first give the Court
the opportunity to establish its credibility").
94 Rome Statute, supra note 26, art. 15(4).
9' Seeid. art. 39(1).
96 See id.
97 Id. art. 39(2)(iii).
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[pre-trial chamber's] judges."98 The statute does not indicate how manyjudges
are in the pre-trial chamber, but since three are authorized to carry out the pre-
trial chamber's functions, it may be inferred that two judges-a majority of
three judges-are needed to approve an authorization.99
The United States could argue that the authorization of two judges is not
sufficient to safeguard its interests. It is unlikely, however, that any two
judges would be motivated by the same political bias as the independently
elected prosecutor. As it stands, the "authorization" safeguard seems an
adequate protection of the United States' (as well as others') interests,
particularly when considering other institutional safeguards.
The statute's requirements for candidates and election protocol also
diminish the possibility that the pre-trial chamber would be politicized.
Candidate and election requirements would ensure that the pre-trial chamber's
authorization to proceed with the investigation would act as an effective check
on the prosecutor's power. That all candidates for judge are required to be
competent in either criminal law or in relevant areas of international law
insures that politicians or others without appropriate experience do not find a
place on the Court.' o In addition, no two judges are permitted to be from the
same state.'0' So even if the judges were to have political agendas, their
agendas would reflect different interests and would thus be unlikely to
coincide.
The independence of the Court is also bolstered by the requirement that the
election of the judges must occur by secret ballot and by no less than two-
thirds of the state parties present and voting.0 2 These provisions will help to
exclude politically minded judges by curbing coercion in the election process.
Finally, the person being investigated may request the disqualification of any
judge when the judge's "impartiality might reasonably be doubted on any
98 Id. art. 57(2)(a). A majority of the pre-trial chamber's judges must concur, not a majority
of the pre-trial division, which is to be comprised of at least six judges. Each division of the
Court (appeals, trial, and pre-trial) has a respective chamber (e.g., the pre-trial chamber) which
carries out the judicial functions of that division. See id. art. 39(2)(a).
" This argument assumes that when the statute states that "the judicial functions of the
Court shall be carried out in each division by Chambers" and thereafter declares that "[t]he
functions of the pre-trial chamber shall be carried out either by three judges of the Pre-Trial
Division or by a single judge of that division," the three judges make up the entire pre-trial
chamber. Rome Statute, supra note 26, art. 39(2)(a) & (2)(b)(iii). Otherwise, the mandate in
article 57(2)(a) that in certain instances, a majority of the pre-trial chamber'sjudges must concur
would be nonsensical, as a majority of a one-judge chamber would have to concur.
'00 See id. art. 36(3)(b)(i)-(ii).
ot See id. art. 36(7).
'0 See id. art. 36(6)(a).
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ground."' 3 These institutional safeguards, coupled with the requisite approval
by the pre-trial chamber, would act to minimize greatly any threat to United
States citizens from a "rogue" prosecutor or Court.'
4
In addition to these safeguards, the United States has a "backup" protection
in the form of a Security Council deferral.0 5 Even though the Security
Council must act unanimously, the United States would have much clout
within the Council if United States citizens were ever unfairly prosecuted.
While much more limited in utility than a veto, the Security Council could
possibly renew a deferral indefinitely, thereby making it as effective as a
veto. 06
Finally, one scholar has argued that the Court's dependence on the Security
Council for enforcement of its arrest warrants and other orders will cause the
Court to rely on the Security Council.' °7 Therefore, the argument goes, there
is no reason for the United States, as a permanent member of the Security
Council, to fear frivolous prosecutions of its nationals.' 8 Unfounded
prosecution of American citizens would be "futile and irrational."'" Since the
court has no political or enforcement powers, it appears the Court would, at
least in some situations, rely on the United Nations for enforcement of its
orders. The Court would therefore be unwise to alienate even one member of
the Security Council.
A. Jurisdictional Concerns: "Opting-Out " and Non-Party Jurisdiction
The United States also has based its opposition to the Rome Statute on the
jurisdictional structure of the statute." 0 For example, the United States
preferred an arrangement where jurisdiction over certain crimes would be
103 Id. art. 41(2)(a)-(b).
'04 See Association ofAmerican Law Schools Panel on the International Criminal Court,
supra note 61, at 259-60.
'05 See Rome Statute, supra note 26, art. 16.
106 See id.
107 See Brown, supra note 29, at 429. Also, ad hoc tribunals such as the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia have had to rely extensively on states to enforce
orders made by the court. See Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, The International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, Address Before the American Society of International Law's
Conference on War Crimes Tribunals: The Record and the Prospects, in 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
1413, 1428(1998).
los See Brown, supra note 29, at 429.
109 Id.
1o See Congressional Testimony, supra note 2 (arguing in part for a ten-year period in which
the Court's jurisdiction over crimes against humanity and war crimes would be optional).
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optional. According to the United States' plan, all state parties would accept
automatic jurisdiction over the crime of genocide."' However, for a ten-year
transitional period, states could "opt-out" of the Court's jurisdiction over two
other crimes: crimes against humanity and war crimes." 2 The United States
favors the use of one of three options after the ten year opt-out period ends.
A state could accept inherent jurisdiction of the court over all three crimes,
cease to be a party, or seek an amendment to the treaty extending this "opt-
out" period." 3
The United States' proposal for optional jurisdiction is similar to the one
incorporated in the ILC's 1994 Draft Statute. Under that draft statute, the
Court was to have inherent jurisdiction over the "core crime" of genocide." 4
The draft statute went on to establish an "opt-in" system where states could
accept the Court'sjurisdiction over each non-core crime. "' The United States'
proposal varied from the 1994 draft statute only in that under the United
States' plan, the Court would have jurisdiction over all crimes unless states
"opted-out."
The United States has argued that an "opt-out" provision would allow it to
evaluate the Court's performance and attract a "broad range" of state parties. "
6
Attracting broad support is likely not a concern now, as the Rome Statute's
text was approved by a vast majority of nations" 7 and will likely be ratified by
the required number of countries. s"8 So the only remaining rationale for the
provision is that it would allow the United States and other nations to
participate in the Court on a limited basis before relinquishing sovereignty to
an untried tribunal.
Despite the fact that an "opt-out" provision might provide nervous nations
a measure of security, the inclusion of an "opt-out" provision in the Court




"" Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10,
U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994), art. 21 [hereinafter 1994 Draft Statute].
"15 See id. art. 22; see also Wexler, supra note 5, at 669 (examining the "opt-in" provision
of the 1994 draft statute and contrasting it with "opt-out" jurisdiction).
... Congressional Testimony, supra note 2.
117 While as of August 5, 1999, only four nations had ratified the Rome Statute (Senegal,
Trinidad and Tobago, San Marino, and Italy), eighty other nations had signed the Rome Statute,
indicating an intent to ratify. Under the statute, sixty nations must ratify the statute. See Rome
Statute, supra note 26, art. 126.
... See Rome Statute Signature and Ratification Chart (visited July 15, 1999) <http:www.
igc.org/icc/rome/html/ratify.html>.
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drawback of the "opt-out" or "opt-in" approaches to jurisdiction is that a much
weaker Court is created as a result. A country prone to such acts could "opt-
out" of jurisdiction over one or more of the following crimes: crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. Thus, the "opt-out"
provision could have worked to the detriment of the United States by causing
the Court to be unable effectively to exercise jurisdiction over non-genocidal
acts conducted by heads of state and government officials. "9 Had the "opt-in"
program been included, the United States might have won the battle but lost
the war against international criminals.
The existence of an "opt-out" provision in the Rome Statute, although
perhaps somewhat beneficial to the United States, is not necessary to protect
American interests and does not warrant the United States' refusal to sign.
The same safeguards that prevent the pre-trial chamber and the Court from
becoming politicized make the "opt-out" provision unessential to American
interests. Electoral requirements, as mentioned above, will insure the
impartiality of the Court. 20 As a result of these protections against a
politicized Court, the United States need not be reluctant to subject its citizens
to the Court's jurisdiction.
The jurisdictional regime based on complementarity-that the Court's
jurisdiction complements national jurisdiction, which is primary--could also
act to provide protection to United States' interests. In the event that the Court
were to prosecute United States citizens, complementarity could provide an
"escape" from the Court's jurisdiction. As mentioned above, the statute
declares cases inadmissible when the case is already being prosecuted or
investigated (or has been) on the national level.' 2' Thus, if the United States
were charged with war crimes, crimes against humanity, or crimes of
aggression, the United States could prevent Court jurisdiction by undertaking
a "genuine" investigation or prosecution. A problem could arise, however,
when the United States believes its citizens to have been unfairly charged.
Suppose, for example, that United States soldiers involved in the 1983
military operation in Panama were charged with the crime of aggression. In
that case, the United States could be deemed unwilling to undertake a genuine
investigation if the situation were not investigated or prosecuted according to
the meaning of the statute. 12 2 So, while complementarity could help the United
19 See Evered, supra note 49, at 149.
120 See supra text accompanying notes 100-102.
121 Rome Statute, supra note 26, art. 17(1)(a)-(b).
122 The statute is unclear about what constitutes an investigation or prosecution. While the
latter is perhaps easier to define, it is especially uncertain as to an "investigation." Need such
"investigation" be by a prosecutor or is a military inquiry sufficient? Many questions remain
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States avoid the Court's jurisdiction even in the absence of an "opt-out"
provision, it would not necessarily do so. Given that the other safeguards,
however, would protect United States' interests, an "opt-out" provision-while
somewhat beneficial to the United States-is not indispensable.
The other jurisdictional concern of the United States involves jurisdiction
over citizens of non-party states. Notwithstanding United States' objections,
the Rome Statute authorizes a form ofjurisdiction over nationals of non-party
states.'23 As a precondition to jurisdiction, either the state where the crime was
committed or the state of nationality of the perpetrator must be a party to the
treaty or have consented to jurisdiction. 24 As a result, the Court could have
jurisdiction over citizens of a non-party state if the crime were committed
within the territory of a state party.
The United States' real concern regarding non-party jurisdiction-and
jurisdiction over state parties were the United States to ratify the Rome
Statute-is that United States military forces (either as part of a United States'
mission or under the rubric of an international peacekeeping mission) could be
exposed to the Court's jurisdiction. All this could occur without United
States' consent to the statute. For example, even if Serbia does not sign the
statute, if it were to consent to jurisdiction, the Court could exercise jurisdic-
tion over United States troops involved in international peacekeeping actions
in Serbia. 25 The United States complains that, ironically, nations involved in
frequent international peacekeeping missions would unfairly be exposed to the
Court'sjurisdiction more often than many of the worst offenders ofhumanitar-
ian law.'26 Citizens of non-party states that commit massacres internally would
be insulated from the Court's reach absent a Security Council referral.' 27
Some have intimated that the Rome Statute's exercise ofjurisdiction over
nationals of non-party states is contrary to international law and, thus, is an
invalid constraint on the sovereignty of those non-party nations. The Vienna
Convention states the general rule of international law that "[a] treaty does not
create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent."'28
unanswered. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 26, art. 15.
123 Id. art. 12(2)(a)-(b).
124 See id.
121 See David Scheffer, America's State in Peace, Security, and Justice (visited Oct. 4, 1999)
<http://www.usia.gov/topical/pol/usandvn/schefby.htm>.
126 See Congressional Testimony, supra note 2.
127 See id.; Association ofAmerican Law Schools Panel on the International Criminal Court,
supra note 61, at 231.
28 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 34, 1115 U.N.T.S. 331,
341.
[Vol. 28:83
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
"[T]he consent of a State is always necessary if it is to be bound by a provision
contained in a treaty to which it is not a party."' 29 The Rome Statute, however,
does not bind non-party states but merely authorizes jurisdiction over citizens
of non-party states. Non-party states are not bound by the treaty.
The United States' decision to remain a non-party state and not to ratify
will cost it any influence on the Court it would otherwise have had. Nationals
of non-party states are subject to jurisdiction when the state where the conduct
in question occurred is a state party or consents to jurisdiction. 3' Under the
statute, United States citizens in some cases would be subject to the Court's
jurisdiction, yet none could serve as judges, and the United States would have
no role in Court elections or in formulating Court procedure. 3' Thus, in
refusing to assent to the statute, the United States gains little and forsakes any
influence over the Court.
B. The Crime ofAggression
The United States has also revealed its opposition to the Court's jurisdic-
tion over the yet-to-be-defined crime of aggression. First, the United States
has argued that the historical precedent for the crime of aggression is
tenuous.'32 The United States has argued that there is a historical precedent for
criminalizing wars of aggression, but no such precedent for proscribing
individual acts of aggression.' While the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg considered aggression to be the "supreme" international crime, that
tribunal specifically condemned only aggressive war and not individual acts
'29 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 324(l)
(1987) (stating that "[a]n international agreement does not create either obligations or rights for
a third state without its consent").
30 See Rome Statute, supra note 26, art. 12(2)(a).
31 Id. Member States may nominate persons to serve asjudges (art. 36(4)(a)); judges shall
be elected at a meeting of the members of the Assembly of State Parties (art. 36(6)(a)); the
prosecutor and deputy prosecutors shall be elected by the members of the Assembly of States
Parties (art. 42(4)); members of the Assembly of States Parties shall participate in the adoption
of the Elements of Crimes, which will assist the Court in the interpretation and application of
articles 6, 7 and 8 (art. 9); and members of the Assembly of States Parties shall define the crime
of aggression and set out conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction over this
crime (art. 5(2)), pursuant to the procedures for amendment of the Statute (arts. 121, 123).
132 See U.S. Statement on the International Criminal Court, Sixth Committee, 51st UN.
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of aggression.'34 In response, some argue that condemnation of aggressive acts
has become part of customary international law and should therefore be
included in any international criminal statute.'35
The United States also has explained its opposition to inclusion of the
crime of aggression by pointing out the lack of an accepted definition for such
a crime. 3 6 This is certainly reinforced by the Rome Statute, which gives the
Court jurisdiction over the crime of aggression only after an amendment is
adopted "defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the
Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime."' 37
The United States also warns that inclusion of the crime of aggression
could "impose unnecessary risks" on military forces acting for the interna-
tional community.' This likely is the United States' chief concern with the
entire statute: that United States soldiers could be accused of aggressive acts,
even where they act in self-defense or for humanitarian purposes.'3 9 The
United States is also worried that members of the military could be charged by
the Court for actions which are part of official military operations. Senator
Jesse Helms (Republican, North Carolina) has bluntly stated his fears that
authorized United States military operations, such as those in Grenada and
Panama, could result in the Court charging United States soldiers with crimes
134 Leila Sadat Wexler, Committee Report on Jurisdiction, Definition of Crimes, and
Complementarity, 25 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 221, 224, 226 (1997) [hereinafter Committee
Report]; see also CONOT, supra note 13, at 23 (emphasizing that the United States pushed for
the prosecution of Nazis for waging an aggressive war and not merely for aggressive acts).
135 See Committee Report, supra note 134, at 226 (stating that most members of the
International Law Association Committee on a Permanent International Criminal Court favor
the inclusion of this crime and its definition in the International Criminal Court statute).
136 See US. Policy, supra note 58, at 19; see also Michael P. Scharf, The Jury Is Still Out
On the Needfor an International Criminal Court, 1991 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 135, 139
(stating that the 1952 draft statute for an International Criminal Court, along with a Draft Code
of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind ("draft code") were not adopted because
of the lack of a definition of aggression); Association of American Law Schools Panel on the
International Criminal Court, supra note 61, at 233 (noting that "[t]he International Law
Commission has tried unsuccessfully for many years to reach agreement on a definition of
aggression").
' Rome Statute, supra note 26, art. 5(l)-(2).
'8 U.S. Policy, supra note 58, at 22.
9 See id. at 20; see also US. Statement on the International Criminal Court, supra note 132
(stating that precedent "concerns particular situations which did not present some of the difficult
issues potentially involved, such as cases of arguable self-defense or humanitarian interven-
tion").
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of aggression or other crimes. 40 For example, had the Rome Statute been in
effect, soldiers involved in the August 1998, United States missile strike
against a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant could have faced indictment if the
Court had deemed any United States investigation not to be genuine.' 4 ' This
threat is heightened because the crime of aggression is yet to be defined.
The inclusion of the crime of aggression does pose a threat to the United
States, but the threat is not overly menacing. According to the statute, after
seven years from its entry of force, any state party may propose amendments
to the statute. 42 Any amendment to article five (crimes within the jurisdiction
of the Court) will enter into force one year after seven-eighths of the states
parties ratify or accept the amendment. 43 Yet "in respect of a State Party
which has not accepted the amendment [to article five], the Court shall not
exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the amendment when
committed by that state party's nationals or on its territory."' 44 In other words,
state parties may decline to be bound by any crimes subsequently added to
article five of the statute.
The crime of aggression, however, will not be a non-binding crime
subsequently added to the litany of article five crimes. Article five already
containsjurisdiction over the crime of aggression. Therefore, any amendments
will not occur to article five but simply will define the already existing crime
of aggression and work out the situations in which the Court will have
jurisdiction over the crime.""5 As a result, the amendments necessary to enable
the Court to exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression would likely be
binding on all states parties-including the United States if it were to
ratify-one year after ratification or acceptance of the amendment by seven-
eighths of the states parties.'46
40 Senator Jesse Helms, Slay This Monster: VotingAgainst the International Criminal Court
Is Not Enough, FuN. TIMES, July 30, 1998, at 12. "This court proposes to sit in judgment on
United States national security policy. Imagine what would have happened if this court had
been in place during the United States invasion of Panama? Or the United States invasion of
Grenada? Or the United States bombing of Tripoli?" Id.
141 See generally William Drozdiak, European Allies Back US. Strikes; Japan Says It
'Understands,' WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1998, at A20 (stating that the United States missile strikes
were launched to "prevent terrorist acts from speeding worldwide").
142 Rome Statute, supra note 26, art. 121(1).
143 See id. art. 121(4)-(5).
4 Id. art. 121(5).
141 See id. art. 5(2).
146 See id. art. 121(4) (stating the "default" rule that, "[e]xcept as provided in paragraph 5,
an amendment shall enter into force for all States Parties one year after instruments of
ratification or acceptance have been deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations
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Without any means of escape, the binding nature of any amendments
regarding the crime of aggression would admittedly be difficult for the United
States to stomach. Yet the Rome Statute does not require any nation to be
bound by amendments with which it cannot agree. Any state party "which has
not accepted [any] amendment may withdraw from the Statute with immediate
effect" by giving notice within one year of the amendment's entry into force. '47
Thus, if seven-eighths of the state parties were to accept a definition of the
crime of aggression with which the United States disagreed, that nation could
then decide to be no longer bound by the Court's Statute. For this reason, the
uncertainty surrounding the crime of aggression should not prevent the United
States from ratifying the Rome Statute. After ratification, the United States
could use the desire of the international community for continued United
States participation to mold a palatable definition of the crime of aggression.
C. The Constitutional Dimension
Constitutional arguments against United States acceptance of the Rome
Statute can be classified in two ways: those asserting that constitutional
guarantees and liberties should be included in the Rome Statute and those
claiming that such guarantees must be included in the Statute. While
"prudential" constitutional arguments should be examined as matters ofpublic
policy, it is more important to examine arguments claiming that any interna-
tional court must include United States constitutional guarantees. There are
two oft-mentioned constitutional arguments of this type: "(1) [That] the full
range of constitutional guarantees must apply to an international criminal court
before the United States may constitutionally participate; [and] (2) United
States criminal procedure guarantees, most notably the right to trial by jury,
must apply to international trials in order for the United States to
participate."
'148
One way to avoid the arguments that either the full range of United States
constitutional guarantees or key constitutional rights must be incorporated into
the Rome Statute is to view the Court as an entity separate from the United
States judicial system.'49 The Court would not be under the control of the
by seven-eighths of them").
147 Id. art. 121(6). This section does condition the state party's withdrawal on the state's
satisfaction of any "obligations arising from this Statute while it was a Party to the Statute,
including any financial obligations which may have accrued." Id. art. 127(2).
,41 Paul D. Marquardt, Law Without Borders: The Constitutionality of an International
Criminal Court, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 73, 104 (1995).
149 See id. at 105.
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United States government but would act under its own authority and apply its
own law."0 Under article III of the United States Constitution, sections one
and two, the judicial power of the United States is "vested in one supreme
Court" and inferior courts established by Congress, and this "judicial Power
shall extend to all Cases... arising under this Constitution.' ' . Since the
judicial power of the United States would not be invoked, article III of the
Constitution would not apply.' Thus, the Court's jurisdiction over United
States nationals ostensibly would not conflict with the United States Constitu-
tion.
If one considers the International Criminal Court to be an independent
entity, the surrender of a person to the Court may essentially involve
extradition to that Court.'53 Even if the process by which suspects are handed
over to the Court is not extradition exactly, it is sufficiently close to extradition
for United States constitutional purposes.
5 4
This "extradition model" would allow United States assent to the Rome
Statute under the Constitution. According to the rule of non-inquiry, United
States courts generally do not review the procedural or substantive rights an
extradited party would have in the requesting nation if the extradition is
authorized by law.' So the law of the requesting entity, here, the Court,
would not have to provide due process guarantees to the extraditee that mirror
those of the Constitution.5 6 There appears to be no valid constitutional or
policy rationale for distinguishing between an international tribunal and the
courts of a foreign nation for extradition purposes.5 7
ISO See id.
s51 U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2.
152 See Marquardt, supra note 148, at 105. Marquardt cites Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S.
197 (1948), to support that international criminal tribunals do not exercise the judicial power of
the United States for purposes of article III. See id. at 106.
153 See Marquardt, supra note 148, at 106.
14 Id. In fact, "surrender" of American nationals to the Court would be more consistent with
United States interests, as the United States government could influence the composition and
procedures of the Court. Conversely, the United States has no control over other nations' courts
to which its citizens are extradited. See id.
"' See id. at 109; see also Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508,512(1911); Neely v. Henkel,
180 U.S. 109, 123 (1901).
156 One possible exception was mentioned by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in dicta
in Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (1960). The court there held that there could be
"procedures or punishment so antipathetic to a federal court's sense of decency as to require
reexamination of the principle." Id. at 79. See generally Marquardt, supra note 148, at 112-13
(arguing that the Gallina exception to the rule of non-inquiry would not enable the United States
to deny extradition to an international criminal court).
11 See Marquardt, supra note 148, at 118.
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The "extradition model" crumbles, however, if the process by which
persons are surrendered to the Court is not extradition or sufficiently
analogous to extradition. The Rome Statute refers to the "surrender" of
suspects and in no way mentions "extradition."' ' Another problem presented
is that extradition may only be possible between two sovereign states.
Extradition occurs where one state agrees to relinquish the accused to a state
withjurisdiction.'59 There are superficial differences between the surrender of
an accused national from a sovereign state to an international criminal court,
which represents the international community as a whole and not a sovereign
government, and traditional extradition.'60 Yet the surrender of a national to
another state with jurisdiction and to an international tribunal with jurisdiction
involve essentially the same act. Thus, "surrender" under the Rome Statute
should be viewed as extradition for purposes of United States constitutional
analysis.
Even if the Court falls outside the scope of article III of the United States
Constitution, some aver that due process rights guaranteed to United States
citizens must be afforded by the Court. Despite the fact that the Court is
international in nature and not subject to article III, the argument is that United
States' cooperation with the Court is nonetheless "properly subject to
constitutional scrutiny."'1'
Yet this assertion that the Court must guarantee accused persons due
process as envisaged by the United States Constitution is flawed. Such an
argument discounts that the rule of non-inquiry generally means that United
States courts do not review the procedural or substantive rights that an
extraditee would be afforded in the requesting nation. This argument seems
to rest on the assumption that surrender to the Court is not extradition or
sufficiently similar to extradition. Yet, as mentioned above, surrender to a
nation or to an international court created by nations appears essentially to be
one and the same.
Ultimately, even if the "extradition model" fails and the United States
Constitution requires that the Rome Statute contain due process guarantees
158 Rome Statute, supra note 26, art. 59(1). This does not necessarily dispose of the question
as to whether extradition is involved, as even if the statute did not construe the transfer as
extradition, the exchange could be treated as extradition for purposes of constitutional analysis.
See Marquardt, supra note 148, at 107.
'" See GEOFF GILBERT, ASPECTS OF EXTRADITION LAW 5, 17 (1991).
'f See Ilia B. Levitine, Constitutional Aspects of an International Criminal Court, 9 N.Y.
INT'L L. REv. 27, 42 (noting that "historically, extradition has been understood to exist
exclusively in the context of relations between sovereign states").
161 Id. at 47.
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based on the United States model, the Rome Statute may sufficiently safeguard
United States due process rights. The United States' cooperation with the
Court may be subject to a "macro level" of scrutiny looking to key "constitu-
tional values" and "not some technical aspects of American constitutional
procedure."' 62 Under this approach, the Court must guarantee key rights
guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Because these due process
guarantees are examined on a "macro" level, that the Court's double jeopardy
provision (art. 20), appellate procedure proviso (arts. 81-84), and non-jury trial
provision (art. 64) differ from the constitutional due process requirements is
not significant. 63 Rather, the Rome Statute would graft onto the world of
international relations the major purpose of the Constitution: to insure the
supremacy of laws.'64
Many of the Rome Statute's provisions were created to meet the demands
of the United States' 65 and are substantially similar to United States constitu-
tional protections. The statute includes provisions generally prohibiting
double jeopardy (art. 20), allowing an appeal of the decision (by either the
defendant or the prosecutor) (arts. 81-83), and providing for a presumption of
innocence (art. 66). The statute also guarantees the right to an attorney (art.
67(d)), the right to a trial "without undue delay" (art. 67(c)), and a right to
avoid self-incrimination (arts. 67(g), 55(a)).' 66 So even though the Rome
Statute does not incorporate all due process guarantees of the United States
Constitution, it may incorporate enough such rights as to comply with due
process in a "macro" sense.
While this "macro" constitutional analysis is attractive, it assumes that
United States constitutional due process guarantees can be satisfied holistically
and mystically. Such an approach miraculously reduces the founding
document of the United States to one overarching principle. Yet there are
assuredly other purposes for the Constitution and for its due process require-
ments in particular, including the safeguarding of individual liberty. The
possible weakness of the "macro" approach need not make the Court
unamenable to the United States Constitution. Because United States
162 Id. at 47.
163 Rome Statute, supra note 26, arts. 20, 64, 8 1-84.
'4 See Levitine, supra note 160, at 47.
165 See, e.g., Congressional Testimony, supra note 2 (stating that the United States
successfully lobbied for several provisions ultimately included in the statute).
1 That certain protections, such as the right to have defense counsel available at an early
stage, are not enumerated in the statute can presumably be resolved by spelling out such
protections in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Association of American Law Schools
Panel on the International Criminal Court, supra note 6 1, at 252-53.
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interaction with the Court can properly be conceived of as extradition, one can
object to this "macro" view of the United States Constitution and still find the
Rome Statute to be valid under the Constitution.
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States has withheld its assent to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, a treaty which may make the concept of an
international criminal tribunal a reality. The Rome Statute, the United States
has maintained, deviates unacceptably from United States objectives for such
a court. The chief concerns cited by the United States relate to the Court's
"trigger" mechanism, the role of the prosecutor, jurisdictional issues,
definitions of crimes, and constitutional issues. As a dominant military power
and leader in peacekeeping efforts, the United States understandably has
indicated its willingness to assent only to an international tribunal which is in
its best interests.
After close examination, however, most United States' concerns with the
Court can be allayed. The Rome Statute is a document that is essentially
consonant with the United States' interests. Much of the statute, in fact,
reflects that nation's influence. By ratifying the International Criminal Court,
the United States would immeasurably bolster the institution.
It remains to be seen whether the International Criminal Court will be a
savior for our troubled times. Opponents of the Court too often have painted
a picture of a flawed tribunal with almost sinister designs. Only the future will
reveal the role of the Court. At the very least, however, the International
Criminal Court offers the possibility of a more just and hopeful reality.
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